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Abstract: This article is based on David 
Bercuson’s keynote address at the 
22nd Military History Colloquium held 
at the University of Waterloo in May 
2011. Bercuson discusses his role in the 
controversy over the panel text about 
the Combined Bomber Offensive at the 
new Canadian War Museum. Arguing 
that the original text was not wrong, 
but reflected older scholarship, he 
concludes by observing that no serious 
scholar, whether a single author or a 
museum staff, should be saved from 
the age-old processes of historical 
review, revision and re-writing to reflect 
more recent research when it is more 
accurate. 
Four years ago I became embroiled in the controversy arising from 
the Canadian War Museum’s exhibit 
of the Allied bomber war, also called 
the “Combined Bomber Offensive” 
or CBO. That controversy came to 
the public’s attention in the fall of 
2006 due to the objections of the 
portrayal of the bomber war in the 
museum by Canadian veterans of 
Bomber Command. The veterans 
were joined by, among others, former 
Canadian chief of the defence staff 
Paul Manson, who had also been 
commander of Canadian Forces Air 
Command and a fighter pilot with 
the Royal Canadian Air Force in 
Europe during the Cold War.1 They 
made various claims that the exhibit 
had, deliberately or inadvertently, 
portrayed the bomber war as terror 
bombing and akin to a war crime. 
They made their case in the media 
and in front of a Senate committee.2 
Eventually they succeeded in having 
the words of the exhibit altered. At no 
time did I ever have any connection 
to any of those activities nor did I 
register any opinion about what they 
were saying. I had played a role in 
an earlier kerfuffle as an advisor to 
the CBC Ombudsman at the time of 
the “Valour and the Horror” series; I 
had no intention of getting involved 
in any such public controversy again.
 I first saw the magnificent new 
Canadian War Museum a few months 
after it opened in 2005 when I was 
invited to sit on a panel organized 
by the Canadian Council of Chief 
Executives at the museum. I cannot 
remember the topic. I do remember 
that we panellists were given a 
guided tour of the museum and I 
distinctly remember being disturbed 
by the words of one panel of the 
bomber exhibit which declared: “The 
value and morality of the strategic 
bomber offensive against Germany 
remains bitterly contested. Bomber 
Command’s aim was to crush 
civilian morale and force Germany 
to surrender by destroying its cities 
and industrial installations. Although 
Bomber Command and American 
attacks left 600,000 Germans dead, 
and more than five million homeless, 
the raids resulted in only small 
reductions in German war production 
until late in the war.” The pictures on 
the panel to the immediate left of 
those words showed, from top to 
bottom, a heavily damaged factory 
complex, a heavily damaged German 
city with a destroyed bridge and 
finally pictures of burned German 
corpses lying in a street or square.
  I had little argument with the 
statement of Bomber Command’s 
aims. I was more than familiar with 
the history of Bomber Command and 
its commander, Air Chief Marshal Sir 
Arthur Harris, including his refusal 
to accede to the wishes the chief of 
the air staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir 
Charles Portal, expressed so often 
in 1944, that Harris ease off his area 
attacks and focus on major strategic 
targets such as oil, transportation 
and the aircraft industry. I also knew 
that about one quarter of Bomber 
Command’s targets were German 
war industry. I was also fully aware 
that the United States Strategic 
Bombing Survey (USSBS) and the 
British Bombing Survey Unit (BBSU) 
– and some historians of the air 
war – had concluded that bombing 
Germany had limited results through 
most of the war.3 Indeed, volume III 
of the official history of the RCAF, 
The Crucible of War, had arrived at 
the same conclusion4 though with 
little research and analysis of its own. 
But other historians and air power 
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theorists had concluded that bombing 
had indeed done much damage 
to the German war economy.5 My 
initial reaction was that Canadian 
War Museum historians had come 
down on the side represented by the 
USSBS and the BBSU. But so what? 
History is replete with conflicts of 
interpretation. 
 I visited the museum twice more 
in the fall of 2006 and amidst the rising 
public controversy I e-mailed a friend 
at the war museum. I said this: “I am 
not getting into this [controversy] 
at all because at the end of the day I 
strongly defend the Museum staff’s 
duty to depict events as they see 
them. But my personal view is this: 
to say flat out that German war 
production was not affected until the 
end of the war completely ignores 
the great slack in the German war 
economy that existed in 1939/40. 
The real question is, how much more 
would the Germans have produced if 
there had been no bombing? I’ll leave 
it at that. If asked I will say this. If 
not, I will stay out. So far no one has 
asked.”6 
 Now, the question I posed 
in that e-mail is a counterfactual 
question. But then much of the 
controversy over the actual effect 
of the Combined Bomber Offensive 
is built on counterfactual discourse. 
To an extent, the amount of damage 
done to Germany by the bombing 
can be measured, and has been, 
several times over. So we can roughly 
estimate what happened even though 
some controversy remains as to when 
the bombing began to have a real 
and incontrovertible impact. But 
we cannot know what else might 
have happened if, say, Harris had 
gone along with Portal and shifted 
completely to industrial targets. 
Thus the conclusions reached by both 
the USSBS and the BBSU, as well 
as a number of historical observers 
– most recently Randall Hansen – 
that different outcomes might have 
occurred if this or that had changed 
in the course of the CBO is entirely 
counterfactual. I believe that the 
very business of history often takes 
us very close to counter factual 
argumentation, but I also believe that 
once our opinions begin to be based 
on what we think might have been as 
opposed to what was, we are on very 
dangerous ground.
 There is a point in “Godfather 
III” where an aging Don Michael 
Corleone declares:”Just when I 
thought I was out... they pull me back 
in.” That’s how I got involved. In mid-
December Dr. Victor Rabinovitch, 
president and CEO of the Canadian 
Museum of Civilization, called me to 
ask if I would join a number of other 
historians in evaluating the bomber 
An Enduring Controversy 
(original panel text):
The value and morality of the strategic 
bomber offensive against Germany 
remains bitterly contested. Bomber 
Command’s aim was to crush civilian 
morale and force Germany to surrender 
by destroying its cities and industrial 
instal lat ions.  Although Bomber 
Command and American attacks left 
600,000 Germans dead, and more than 
five million homeless, the raids resulted 
in only small reductions in German war 
production until late in the war.
The German city of Cologne, smashed by Allied bombing, as it appeared in 1945 .
Ca
na
di
an
 F
or
ce
s 
Jo
in
t I
m
ag
er
y 
Ce
nt
re
 (C
FJ
IC
) P
L 
42
53
6
2
Canadian Military History, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 3, Art. 6
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss3/6
57
war display. I was very reluctant to 
get involved and I told him about 
the note I had already written to 
my friend at the museum. He did 
not change his mind. I then told 
him that I wanted to consult with 
another colleague of mine before 
giving him my answer. I talked to 
Jack Granatstein. He urged me to 
accept. I did. Then I informed my 
friend at the museum on 11 January 
2007. I wrote: “I stressed to Mr. R. my 
absolute confidence in you and the 
rest of the staff. The professionalism, 
etc. Your credentials. I told him I’d 
write nothing that I would not say to 
you over a scotch.”7
 I went to look at the exhibit for a 
fourth time on the last day of January 
2007. This time I read every word 
of every panel and took copious 
photographs. Then I wrote up my 
report. It is on the record, and I will 
not read it here in its entirety. None of 
the complaints made by the veterans 
changed my own view of the panel. 
I basically ignored the public debate. 
I believed then and I believe now 
that every Canadian has a right to 
his or her own opinion on just about 
anything and veterans no less. But 
I am also mindful of the words of 
the late US Senator Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan that “everyone is entitled 
to his own opinion, but not to his 
own facts,” and I didn’t think that 
the public debate was producing any 
new facts or adding new information 
to the historical record. So I based 
my report on my reading of several 
dozen books and many articles that 
had appeared on the bomber war up 
to that point including those that had 
concluded that the bomber war was 
largely a waste. This is how I started 
my report:
The Combined Bomber Offensive was of 
inestimable value in the Allied victory 
over the Axis in the Second World;
•	 An enormous amount of resources 
was devoted to the CBO in both 
men and materiel and I seriously 
doubt whether or not any “reliable” 
or	 “scientific”	 answer	will	 ever	 be	
given as to whether or not those 
resources	were	“well”	or	efficiently	
spent as compared to other possible 
use of those resources;
•	 Allied war leaders from President 
Roosevelt and Prime Minister 
Churchill to the air chiefs sincerely 
and deeply believed that the CBO 
would contribute enormously to the 
winning of the war – Sir Arthur 
Harris seems to have believed that 
bombing alone might win it;
•	 Bombing alone did not win the war.
•	 The nature of the war – total war – 
frames this controversy;
•	 The Allied leaders of 1941/42 had 
little choice but to use an air war as 
one means of striking at Nazi power 
until	 sufficient	ground	 forces	were	
available to do so; 
•	 The smashing of German cities was 
a deliberate act. Enemy morale was 
most certainly a target of the CBO 
and although the outright killing of 
civilians is almost never referred to 
in wartime documents as an actual 
aim, other euphemisms are employed 
(such as “de-housing”) so as to 
give a general picture that German 
cities, and everything in them 
that sustained the life, civilization, 
and culture of the enemy, and 
specifically	his	productive	capacity,	
were legitimate targets of war;
•	 They most certainly were legitimate 
targets of war…; 
•	 The utter devastation visited upon 
German cities, and German society, 
economy, infrastructure, way of life, 
etc, by the CBO was a major factor 
in both dispelling any “stab in the 
back” myth following the Allied 
victory and in convincing post-war 
German leaders to pursue economic 
integration with the rest of Europe 
as a means of ending intra-European 
conflict.
I also said “I believe that, on the 
whole, the museum has provided a 
balanced presentation of Canada’s 
role in the bomber war.” I observed 
that a panel on the other side of the 
room had declared that “Attacks 
on industrial centres, military 
installations and cities devastated 
vast areas and killed hundreds 
of thousands. They also diverted 
German resources from other fronts 
and damaged essential elements of 
the German war effort.” I pointed 
out that those words contradicted 
the words in the panel that was the 
centre of so much controversy.8 So 
here was the same museum and the 
same staff but with different words 
about the same set of events. That 
was puzzling.
 As to the panel in question, I 
agreed entirely with the first sentence 
of the panel which said that both the 
The Bombing Campaign 
(revised panel text):
The strategic bombing campaign 
against Germany, an important part of 
the Allied effort that achieved victory, 
remains a source of controversy today. 
Strategic bombing enjoyed wide public 
and political support as a symbol 
of Allied resolve and a response to 
German aggression. In its first years, 
the air offensive achieved few of its 
objectives and suffered heavy losses. 
Advances in technology and tactics, 
combined with Allied successes on 
other fronts, led to improved results. 
By war’s end, Allied bombers had 
razed portions of every major city in 
Germany and damaged many other 
targets, including oil facilities and 
transportation networks. The attacks 
blunted Germany’s economic and 
military potential, and drew scarce 
resources into air defence, damage 
repair, and the protection of critical 
industries. Allied aircrew conducted 
this gruelling offensive with great 
courage against heavy odds. It required 
vast material and industrial efforts 
and claimed over 80,000 Allied lives, 
including more than 10,000 Canadians. 
While the campaign contributed greatly 
to enemy war weariness, German 
society did not collapse despite 
600,000 dead and more than five 
million left homeless. Industrial output 
fell substantially, but not until late in the 
war. The effectiveness and the morality 
of bombing heavily-populated areas in 
war continue to be debated.
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value and the morality of the CBO 
“remains bitterly contested.” I then 
suggested that the words “one of” be 
inserted into the second sentence of 
the panel statement so that it would 
read “one of Bomber Command’s 
aims was to crush civilian morale…” 
instead of “Bomber Command’s aim 
was to crush civilian morale.” I made 
that suggestion because although 
Harris declared from time to time 
that his aim was to destroy virtually 
every German city and kill as many 
civilians as he could, his aircraft did 
attack precision and industrial targets 
from Peenemünde to the dams raid to 
the Dortmund-Ems Canal to major oil 
and transportation targets and so on. 
To declare that Bomber Command’s 
sole aim was to crush German morale 
was simply wrong. This is not a 
matter of interpretation. It is a matter 
of fact.
 I found two things troubling 
about the third sentence which 
began with the word “although,” 
as in “Although Bomber Command 
and American attacks….” I thought 
then and I think now that the word 
“although” added an editorial tone to 
the statement. It implies that the great 
loss of German life was inflicted for 
little positive return to the Allied war 
effort. I thought that was taking sides 
in the controversy by suggesting 
that the bombing was a waste of 
resources and took “innocent” 
civilian life to no real effect. The 
second problem with the sentence 
was that it ignored the whole issue 
about what impact bombing had on 
Germany’s mobilization of its war 
resources after 1942/1943. 
 Now admittedly, as I said earlier, 
I was raising a counter factual point. 
No one can ever know what might 
have happened to the mobilization of 
German war production after Albert 
Speer became minister of armaments 
and war production in early 1942 
had the CBO been terminated at that 
point. Thus I admit that there were 
better arguments I could have made. 
My excuse is that I had neither the 
time nor the space to summarize the 
literature as it existed in 2006. Had I 
had more time and space, I could have 
marshalled the massive evidence 
then in existence which showed that 
the sentence was historically faulty 
in two significant ways. First it says 
that the reductions in German war 
production were “small” and then 
it says that they only really had an 
impact until later in the war. 
 Let’s look at the first point. 
Recent scholarship – but scholarship 
available to the Museum staff by 
2006 – shows that early conclusions 
arrived at by J.K. Galbraith and the 
USSBS, the BBSU, Max Hastings, 
The Crucible of War, and others about 
the ineffectiveness of the bombing 
were quite simply wrong. There is no 
time here to do a thorough literature 
review of some of those works but 
I will mention Richard Overy, Why 
the Allies Won (1995), Gian P. Gentile, 
How Effective Is Strategic Bombing? 
(2001), Alan J. Levine, The Strategic 
Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945 
(1992), Robin Neillands, The Bomber 
War (2001), Stephen L. McFarland, 
America’s Pursuit of Precision Bombing, 
1910-1945 (2004), Stephen Bodiansky, 
Air Power (2004) and last but not 
least, Adam Tooze, The Wages of 
Destruction: The Making and Breaking 
of the Nazi Economy (2006). All of these 
historians came to essentially the 
same conclusions: Allied bombing 
began the systematic destruction of 
the Luftwaffe by early 1944. Allied 
bombing destroyed the German 
synthetic oil industry by the fall of 
1944. Allied bombing wreaked havoc 
with the German rail transportation 
system by mid-1944 and the canal 
system by the fall of 1944. German 
war industry was dead by the start of 
1945. All from bombing.
 Adam Tooze, whose primary 
sources were largely drawn from the 
Third Reich’s own statistics or from 
German wartime industry, discusses 
some of these impacts in minute 
detail. He shows how bombing 
literally cut the Ruhr off from the rest 
of Germany, and warped the already 
overstretched German war economy 
to such an extent that virtually every 
kind of economic activity in Germany 
was dedicated to war production and 
everything else was stamped out by 
the Nazis. He shows that the impact 
of the bombing on fighter production, 
for example, was to force the Germans 
to keep on building more and more 
obsolete aircraft like the Bf 109. He 
concludes that “it was not territorial 
losses that paralyzed the German 
economy but the onset of a campaign 
of aerial bombardment, of completely 
unprecedented intensity.”9
 Virtually all these authors wrote 
about both the RAF’s “area” bombing 
campaign and the USAAF “precision” 
campaign. It can be argued that it 
was really the US bombing that did 
most of that damage; Speer certainly 
declared that to be so.10 But in the 
last sentence of the Canadian War 
Museum panel, the words refer to 
“Bomber Command and American 
attacks” killing 600,000 Germans. It 
does not separate the two campaigns. 
It is a fair statement because the 
USAAF did engage in area bombing 
in Europe, although not nearly with 
the ferocity that Bomber Command 
did.11 
 The later authors I mentioned 
above are no more the guardians of 
historical truth than the earlier ones, 
but there is, in my view, a clear trend 
that has emerged over the last 15 or so 
years in those whose work has been 
rooted in German sources. Namely, 
that the Combined Bomber Offensive 
was, as Overy claimed, a decisive 
factor in Allied victory. That point 
of view is completely ignored in the 
offending paragraph. I must say that 
even more recent scholarship such 
as Randall Wakelam’s The Science of 
Bombing (2009) and Robert S. Ehlers 
Jr., Targeting the Third Reich (2009) 
have added to the mountain of 
evidence that now exists. It is a fact, 
not interpretation, that the bomber 
war added greatly to Allied victory 
and that the bombing campaign 
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began to seriously erode Germany’s 
capacity to re-arm itself at least as 
early as Operation Pointblank in 
February 1944 – a date that was 
certainly not “late in the war.”
 Now to the second point. There 
is an implication in using a phrase 
such as “late in the war” that it was 
essentially all over but the shouting. 
Or, we had pounded them enough 
by then, the war was as good as won, 
so it was time to let up, at least with 
area bombing. The argument is often 
made when referring to the bombing 
of Dresden in mid-February 1945. But 
what does “late in the war mean?” 
What did the war museum’s staff 
mean when they used the words “late 
in the war”? Could they have meant, 
say, 12 January 1945? That was the 
day the Red Army launched its last 
great offensive of the war. It is also 
a date by which Hitler’s Ardennes 
offensive had been completely 
snuffed out at terrible cost to the 
Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe, and the 
western Allies were entering the last 
phases of preparing for the Battle of 
the Rhineland that would begin on 
8 February. The war in Europe had 
raged for roughly five years, four 
months and two weeks; it had about 
115 days – eleven weeks – to run.
 Well, what did happen after 12 
January 1945? Someone has made 
the calculation that about 22,000 
people – soldiers and combatants – 
were killed each day of the war. That 
is a very rough and perhaps unfair 
figure to use in an analysis such as 
this, but the point can be made that 
if 12 January 1945 was “late in the 
war,” then about 2.5 million more 
people were yet to die in cities, in 
death and concentration camps, in 
underground rocket manufacturing 
bunkers and, of course on the fighting 
fronts, at sea and in the air. Hitler 
had 11 weeks yet to shoot himself in 
his bunker in Berlin. So even by 12 
January 1945 there was a huge chunk 
of the war remaining and although 
German chances of victory were nil 
by then, a lot more people were killed 
A Canadian Halifax awaits its next mission. In the foreground sits the cache of deadly bombs.
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before the end came 
because Hitler would 
not surrender, and the 
high ranks of the Nazi 
Party – including Speer 
– stood with him and 
did all they could to 
keep the war going. 
 A n d  w h a t  o f 
Canada’s soldiers? If 
12 January is taken 
as “late in the war” – 
and thus of little real 
consequence – what 
are we to make of the 
approximately 5,300 
Canadians who were 
kil led or wounded 
in the Battle of the 
Rhineland alone. If 
the war was all over 
but the shouting on 12 
January 1945, a lot of 
Canadians were yet to 
be killed or wounded. 
Thus to declare that 
Allied bombing had 
little effect until “late 
in the war” is virtually 
meaningless because 
the phrase “late in the 
war” is only true in 
the temporal sense if 
we accept 12 January 
1945 as the point where 
“lateness” begins.
 But  the  phrase 
“late in the war,” like 
“late in life” or “late in the game” 
is not precise. Churchill became 
prime minister “late in life.” The 
Blue Jays won their second World 
Series “late in the game.” The phrase 
is descriptive in some ways but is 
close to useless if we seek precision. 
When a museum, or a historian, uses 
but three sentences to summarize a 
long-standing controversy, the words 
chosen should be selected with great 
care to convey as much clarity as 
possible. 
 These factors were behind the 
conclusions I arrived at: “that the 
exhibit as it now stands does not 
violate the Interpretive Development 
Guidelines of the Canadian War 
Museum as circulated to me. 
However, whether intended or not 
(and I do not believe that it was the 
intent of the CWM) it is possible for 
some visitors to conclude that the 
CBO exhibit has “taken sides” in the 
now long running controversy that 
pits the morality of the CBO against 
its utility due to some unfortunate 
wording and the juxtaposition of both 
text and photos….” I was referring 
here to the photo of burned German 
corpses that had been placed to the 
left of the panel in question. 
 I went on to say :
I believe that the attempt 
to achieve balance is, 
in fact, too balanced 
and that one statement 
in the exhibit, namely 
“Attacks on industrial 
c e n t r e s ,  m i l i t a r y 
installations and cities 
devastated vast areas 
and killed hundreds 
of thousands. They 
also diverted German 
resources from other 
fronts and damaged 
essential elements of the 
German war effort”– 
which in my view is 
correct – is in direct 
contradiction to the 
statement… “Although 
Bomber  Command 
and American attacks 
left 600,000 Germans 
dead, and more than 
five million homeless, 
the raids resulted in 
only small reductions 
i n  G e r m a n  w a r 
p r o d u c t i o n  u n t i l 
late in the war.” The 
contradiction should 
be resolved…. I think 
that is easily remedied 
by, say an additional 
photograph [of German 
aircraft grounded due 
to lack of fuel] and a graph or 
chart [of the decline of German war 
production]…. I think that although 
the text panel in question does 
present some current understanding 
of “some of the impacts of the 
bombing campaign,” it could very 
easily present more of the actual 
dilemma faced by Allied leaders by 
presenting a greater emphasis on 
the damage done to the German war 
effort by the CBO. The CBO killed 
large numbers of German civilians. 
It was intended to do so whether or 
not air crews were let in on the secret. 
The killing of those civilians was an 
A Lancaster, with its bomb bay doors open, 
flies over Munich, Germany, 19 April 1945.
CF
JIC
 P
L 
14
42
57
6
Canadian Military History, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 3, Art. 6
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss3/6
61
inevitable outcome of the need to 
critically damage the German ability 
to wage war well in advance of the 
break-in to Germany on the ground. 
War is by its very nature a collective 
act and no one who is a part of the 
collectivity that is at war can expect 
to be saved harmless from it. The 
ultimate immorality would have 
been to not fight the Nazis with all 
the power at the command of the 
Allied leadership. In my view, this 
is a truism that is not put clearly 
enough in this exhibit.12
 To summarize, I challenged the 
historical accuracy of the panel and 
suggested some minor changes in 
the text to make it right. I suggested 
adding a chart showing the decline 
in German war production as it 
was and a photo of German aircraft 
sitting idle due to the success of the 
bombing campaign against German 
fuel production. I did not draw 
conclusions based on the objections of 
the veterans and I did not disparage 
the professionalism nor the integrity 
of the CWM’s historical staff. I 
thought they had got it wrong and 
that since the matter was now in the 
public realm, they ought to make the 
very slight modifications I suggested 
to get it historically accurate. Let me 
emphasize; in my reading of dozens 
of books and articles on the bomber 
war including the Speer memoirs and 
other related sources, there is simply 
no doubt that the bombing campaign 
made a contribution to Allied victory 
and to state that it did not “until late 
in the war” is just plain wrong.
 My position four years ago 
and now is that when unwarranted 
changes to an exhibit are demanded 
by a part of the public for emotional 
or political reasons they ought to be 
strongly resisted. I do understand 
why many veterans were offended. 
But that was and is not sufficient 
reason to alter the conclusions that 
historians arrive at. On the other 
hand, all of us historians make 
mistakes. When those mistakes are 
pointed out to us, we ought to revise 
our work. With great respect, I don’t 
know why the collective historians of 
the CWM should live by a different 
set of rules than I do. And that is why 
I made the suggestions I did.
 In the end my report and those of 
my three colleagues were submitted 
to Dr. Rabinovitch. Desmond Morton 
and Margaret MacMillan had urged 
that no changes be made in the exhibit, 
while Serge Bernier questioned 
whether the panel was even necessary. 
Dr. Rabinovitch summarized our 
findings in a 7 March 2007 letter to 
Claudette Roy, chair of the Canadian 
Museum of Civilization Corporation 
Board of Trustees. In that letter Dr. 
Rabinovitch summarized the process 
by which we had been chosen and 
what we had written. In light of 
the lack of unanimity among us, he 
wrote, he would have to “draw his 
own conclusions,” namely “that the 
bomber command section, including 
the text panel in question, provides a 
balanced presentation and does take 
into account the best information 
known to historians today.” Thus 
he would “ask the museum staff to 
consider how to draw attention to 
the range of literature and opinions 
available on this subject” so that 
“visitors will thus be encouraged to 
enquire further in order to draw their 
personal conclusions.” There was no 
indication whatever in the letter that 
the words of the controversial panel 
were to be changed.13 On 11 March 
Dr. Rabinovitch e-mailed all of us, 
told us of his letter to Ms Roy, and 
made no mention of any decision to 
change the panel’s wording.14 In fact 
I did not learn until October when 
I was contacted by a CBC reporter 
that a new text for the panel had 
been decided on. I thought the new 
wording more accurate but confusing 
and somewhat convoluted. Certainly 
it was too long and it meandered like 
a yazoo stream. It reminds me of the 
proverbial camel – a horse invented 
by a committee.
 My role in the controversy ended 
then. But the controversy was not 
over. The Senate conducted hearings 
into the panel; I did not take part and 
I did not approve of the hearings. In 
the fall of 2008 Margaret MacMillan, 
Robert Bothwell, and Randall Hansen, 
who had just published Fire and Fury: 
The Allied Bombing of Germany, 1942-
1945 co-authored a Queen’s Quarterly 
art icle  entit led “Controversy, 
Commemoration, and Capitulation; 
The Canadian War Museum and 
Bomber Command.” Several pages 
into the article the authors wrote “the 
other two historians [David Bercuson 
and Serge Bernier] admitted the fact 
of the controversy but found the 
exhibit tendentious and hurtful to 
the veterans.”15 That was wrong. 
What I did say was that “whether 
intended or not (and I do not believe 
that it was the intent of the CWM) 
it is possible for some visitors to 
conclude that the CBO exhibit has 
‘taken sides’ in the now long running 
controversy…”. I also said “As to 
the photos, I believe that the photos, 
especially that of partially denuded, 
burned, etc., human remains has 
added to the sting of the words for 
some veterans.” Those were the only 
times I used the word “veteran” 
in my report. The authors of the 
Queen’s Quarterly article defended the 
panel’s statement that “bombing had 
relatively small effects on German 
industrial production until late in 
the war.” They did point out that 
some people disagreed with that 
conclusion, but the only challenger 
they mentioned was retired CDS 
Paul Manson. They did not mention 
Tooze, Gentile, Levine, or any other 
of the reputable scholars who took 
opposing views. Their main thrust 
was that the war museum had been 
attacked by the veterans, that the 
museum had caved in and that the 
precedent set was a very bad one. 
That may be so – I still have no idea 
why the panel was changed or how 
the new wording was arrived at – but 
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I never saw myself as being part of an 
attack on the war museum 
 Margaret MacMillan wrote of 
the controversy in her book, The 
Uses and Abuses of History (2008) 
repeating in a more condensed 
form the reasons laid out in the 
Queen’s Quarterly article as to why 
she believed the exhibit ought not to 
have been changed. Randall Hansen’s 
book Fire and Fury summarized the 
dispute in its preface but one of the 
strongest and most ironic themes of 
his book is just how truly effective 
American bombing became by mid-
1944, especially in hitting oil targets 
and the aircraft industry. Hansen 
contrasts the US air campaign to that 
of Harris, who in Hansen’s view, 
stuck to area bombing and to his 
intention to kill as many Germans 
as he could wherever they were no 
matter how much his boss Portal 
tried to convince him otherwise. The 
key chapter is entitled “Oil and baby 
Killing.”16
 One of the most cogent analyses 
of the controversy to appear was that 
of Professor David Dean, director 
of the Carleton Centre for Public 
History. In a March 2009 article for 
Museum and Society Dean pointed 
out that although the war museum’s 
mandate is to be a museum and not 
a memorial – unlike the Australian 
War Memorial – the CWM is in reality 
“both a history museum and a palace 
of memory; indeed for some it is a 
secular sacred space.” He points to 
the presence of the Royal Canadian 
Legion Hall of Honour, the model of 
the War memorial, Regeneration Hall 
and the memorial Hall “dominated 
by the grave of the Unknown Soldier, 
stone walls cut to resemble the 
thousands of tombstones marking 
graves of the Canadians fallen in 
Europe…” This is, he says, not only 
a museum, but a “sacred site, a site 
of memory, of contemplation.”17 His 
point, I think, is that the very layout 
and construction of the building may 
have led some to believe that the 
CWM’s job was to honour without 
hesitation and to write no words 
or display no panels or artefacts 
that jarred the process of honour no 
matter what the museum’s official 
mandate is.
 But that is part of another debate. 
My reason for being here today is to 
set the record straight about how I 
became involved in the controversy, 
how I arrived at the conclusions 
I did, and what role I played in 
re-writing the panel in question – 
namely, none at all. The controversy 
about the morality of killing German 
(and Japanese) citizens will go on. 
It should go on. And more research 
is necessary from Axis public and 
private sources to determine the 
actual impact of the bombing. It is 
surely time to end the almost slavish 
reliance of early writers on the 
opaque findings of the USSBS and 
the BBSU. The evidence is still there 
and more and more scholars will find 
it. Indeed, in that part of his book 
about the US air war, even Randall 
Hansen found it. In a telling passage 
of his book describing a conversation 
before the December 1944 Battle of 
the Bulge between Speer and Albert 
Vögler, who was both a strong Nazi 
and an industrialist, Speer declares: “I 
think…that Hitler is playing his last 
card and knows it, too. Vögler flashed 
Speer an almost contemptuous look. 
Of course it’s his last card, now that 
our production is collapsing right, 
left, and centre.”18 No serious scholar, 
whether a single author or a museum 
staff, should be saved from the age-
old processes of historical review, 
revision and re-writing to reflect 
more recent research when it is more 
accurate. 
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